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Running To Stand Still:  Late Modernity’s Acceleration Fixation 
 
Abstract 
That we live in a time of unprecedented and ever increasing change is both a 
shibboleth of our age and the more or less explicit justification for all manner of 
‘strategic’ actions. The seldom, if ever, questioned assumption is that our now is more 
ephemeral, more evanescent, than any that preceded it. In this paper, we subject this 
assumption to some critical scrutiny, utilizing a range of empirical detail. In the face 
of this assay we find the assumption to be considerably wanting. We suggest that 
what we are actually witnessing is mere acceleration, which we distinguish as 
intensification along a pre-existing trajectory, parading as more substantive and 
radical movement away from a pre-existing trajectory. Deploying Deleuze’s (2004) 
terms we are, we suggest, in thrall to representation of the same at the expense of 
repetition of difference. Our consumption by acceleration, we argue, both occludes 
the lack of substantive change actually occurring whilst simultaneously delimiting 
possibilities of thinking of and enacting the truly radical. We also consider how this 
set up is maintained, thus attempting to shed some light on why we are seemingly 
running to stand still. As the Red Queen said, ‘it’s necessary to run faster even to stay 
in the one place’ 
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Running To Stand Still:  Late Modernity’s Acceleration Fixation 
‘[C]hangeful’ is the word that best describes our future. The only thing 
that will not change is the presence of change itself.”1 
Introduction 
We live, apparently, in a world of change and the only thing that we can do to survive 
in this world is change ourselves, and the organizations we inhabit. Such is the 
underlying assertion of the endlessly proclaimed needs for investment in science and 
technology, for privatization, for downsizing and de-layering, for the flexibility they 
seek to deliver, and, indeed, for ‘change management’ itself (see Grey 2003). In short, 
the assertion of a world of change justifies the majority of the so-called ‘strategic’ 
actions governing the formal organization of our lives. The call to change in the face 
of change becomes even shriller when it is supplemented by the assertion that the 
world is now changing faster than ever before; that we, more than any previous 
generation, live in an age of rapid and continual change, in an age where the rate of 
change is inexorably accelerating. James Gleick’s (1999) best-selling book Faster: 
The Acceleration of Just About Everything taps into, describes and reflects this 
commonly held view of the world: the world is changing, quickly and more quickly 
than ever before.  
This paper critically examines this ubiquitous assertion. For rather than bow to 
the received wisdom that things are changing faster than ever before, our central point 
is that it is equally arguable to suggest that we live in a time, particularly compared to 
the period 1850-1950, of relative stasis.  
At the outset we need to clarify whom we are talking about when we say that 
‘we’ live in a time of relative stasis. A Rwandan in 1994 or an Iraqi in 2003 would 
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hardly accept such an assertion. Broadly speaking, we are only referring to those 
living in the developed western world, most specifically the United States of America. 
And of course, even in this region we recognize that the empirical reality of particular 
places and individuals will be at variance with our overall thesis. 
The Consumption of Movement by Hyperbolized Speed and Acceleration 
There is endless fascination with the idea that we are accelerating towards a new, 
different tomorrow. Glittering new digital tools are in our hands and the technologists 
have found the immutable laws that will drive us ever faster into the future. Moore’s 
‘Law’, for example, states that ‘every two years the number of transistors on the same 
size chip doubles’, sometimes amended to ‘the power and speed of computing 
doubles about every two years, while the cost remains about the same’. Smaller, 
cheaper, better technology: the multiplying grains of rice that will finally overbalance 
the chessboard. James Gleick fills his book with data and anecdotes that reinforce the 
truism of our age: we, more than any previous generation, live in an age of rapid and 
continual change and, furthermore, the rate of that change is increasing. Evidence, 
seemingly, if often only implicitly, of a supercharging of the motor of history. 
And Gleick is right. But he tells only part of the story. We live, undoubtedly in 
an age of increasing acceleration but, paradoxically, it is our contention that this 
acceleration is itself an occlusion of the lack of substantive movement in the 
organization of our world.  Let us attempt to explain this apparent non sequitur. To do 
so we draw upon a distinction drawn by Deleuze (2004) between representation and 
repetition. For Deleuze, representation simply re-presents, producing a mere 
impression of movement, which remains, at heart, false. He opposes this to repetition, 
which he sees as the essence of ‘real movement’ (2004: 26). This valorization of 
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‘repetition’ is close to that accorded to ‘becoming’ in much contemporary social 
theorizing. Indeed, as Žižek (2004: 12) makes the comparison: 
becoming is… strictly correlative to the concept of REPETITION: far from being 
opposed to emergence of the New, the proper Deleuzian paradox is that 
SOMETHING TRULY NEW CAN ONLY EMERGE THROUGH REPETITION. 
What repetition repeats is not the way the past ‘effectively was’ but the virtuality 
inherent to the past and betrayed by its past actualization. 
For Deleuze, reality is the dynamic relationship between the virtual and the actual, 
between the possible and its present limited instantiations.  Repetition retains and 
renews the possibility of the virtual, whilst representation constrains it in the actual in 
which it is doomed to simply replay. The distinctions between representation and 
repetition are respectively rendered by Deleuze (2004: 27) thus: ‘One is negative… 
the other affirmative… One is static, the other dynamic… One is revolving, the other 
evolving.’  
Despite our contemporary celebration of the (faux) dynamism of hyperbolized 
speed and acceleration, it is more substantive movement, more real change, that we 
require. What we do not need is more acceleration. For acceleration is conservative, 
reactionary and all the more so when it presents itself cloaked in the garb of its 
authentically innovative other, the movement that it thus yearns to snuff out. In its 
playing out through extension of extant trajectories of continuing but familiar 
‘change’, it seeks above all to smother and conceal the horror attendant upon the 
realization that there is nothing new, that radical change is no more. Or as Beckett 
bluntly put it: “The sun shone, having no alternative, on the nothing new” (Beckett 
1963:5). The consumption of movement by hyperbolized speed and acceleration 
allows the latter to parade as the former. In this masquerade, the fundamental stasis of 
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the moment is occluded beneath the froth created by breathless talk of a faster 
tomorrow. Plus ça change, plus ça même chose! 
It is perhaps useful to present some examples of this ‘breathless talk’.  Let us 
start with the uber-guru of management, Tom Peters, and his latest book Re-imagine! 
Business excellence in a disruptive age (2003), which repeats (and repeats) the same 
theme of his earlier books such as Thriving on chaos (1987) and Liberation 
management: necessary disorganization for the nanosecond nineties (1992): “We 
pursue preservation. But the old order is doomed. We value permanence. But 
“permanence” is the last refuge of those with shriveled imaginations. We practice 
change. But “change” is not enough. (Not nearly)” (Peters 2003: 30).  It is not enough 
because we live “in a time of discontinuous change” and in this kind of world, small 
change (incrementalism) is insufficient; “incrementalism is the enemy” (p. 40, 
original emphasis).  Thus, according to Peters, “[t]he need to embrace ‘change’ (in 
fact, to go beyond ‘change’... way beyond change) is imperative” (p. 32).  Bill Gates, 
the richest man in the world, echoes this rhetoric in his book, Business @ the Speed of 
Thought: Succeeding in the Digital Economy (Gates 2000) which is peppered with 
sentences like the following: “If the 1980s were about quality and the 1990s were 
about reengineering, then the 2000s will be about velocity. About how quickly the 
nature of business will change.”  Gates reiterates the message endlessly.  In 1999, at 
Georgetown University School of Business, he asserted that:  
business is going to change more in the next 10 years than it has in the last 50. I 
believe the rules of how a business works are going to be so different that only the 
companies that seize the opportunity to do things a new way will be the ones that are 
successful in the years ahead.2 
Seven years later he concluded his address to 100 top CEOs with the following: “So 
[there are] plenty of things that let us focus our $6 billion of R&D on, on moving 
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software to the next frontier, and a pace of change that I can say confidently will be as 
fast as it's been in any of these last 10 years.”3  Gates’ message is repeated and 
repeated, especially by those in positions of power.  Tony Blair at the Labour Party 
Conference in 2005, in his aptly titled keynote speech, We are the change-makers, 
asserts that “[t]he world is on the move again: the change in the early 21st century [is] 
even greater than that of the late 20th century”.4   
What is interesting about these types of claims is that they are almost always 
presented without a shred of evidence.  One person who does marshal data to buttress 
the argument is the inventor and computer scientist Ray Kurzweil. In a series of 
publications and website (www.kurzweilAI.net), Kurzweil (1999, 2001, 2005) argues 
that the exponential growth that Moore’s Law attributes to chip power, is an inherent 
feature of information-driven human technologies, including genomics:  
An analysis of the history of technology shows that technological change is 
exponential, contrary to the common-sense "intuitive linear" view. So we 
won't experience 100 years of progress in the 21st century – it will be more 
like 20,000 years of progress (at today's rate). The "returns," such as chip 
speed and cost-effectiveness, also increase exponentially. There's even 
exponential growth in the rate of exponential growth. Within a few decades, 
machine intelligence will surpass human intelligence, leading to The 
Singularity – technological change so rapid and profound it represents a 
rupture in the fabric of human history. The implications include the merger of 
biological and nonbiological intelligence, immortal software-based humans, 
and ultra-high levels of intelligence that expand outward in the universe at 
the speed of light (Kurzweil 2001). 
Kurzweil’s thesis is influential; on the cover of his latest book, Bill Gates endorses 
him as “the best person I know at predicting the future of artificial intelligence”. This 
“exponential growth in the rate of exponential growth” is, according to Kurzweil, 
bringing us to a ‘singularity’, akin to astrophysical discontinuities like black holes and 
the Big Bang.  Accelerating technology will bring us to this singularity – within about 
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thirty years – where “our intelligence will become increasingly nonbiological and 
trillions of times more powerful than it is today—the dawning of a new civilization 
that will enable us to transcend our biological limitations and amplify our creativity” 
(Kurzweil 2005: front flap).  We do not wish to detain ourselves much further with 
Kurzweil, save to make the following points.  First, systems that exhibit exponential 
growth do not do so without end.  Stabilization, regression or collapse are more 
plausible future scenarios.  Second, taking an energy rather than an information 
perspective, ‘peak oil’ proponents (www.peakoil.org and www.peakoil.net) argue that 
the exponential growth in world oil production ended in 1970 (Duncan 2005-6) and 
that the decline in oil supplies will cause the collapse of industrial civilization within 
the next 25 years.  Third, as Kelly (2006) has pointed out,  
 [i]f you define the singularity as the near-vertical asymptote you get when 
you plot an exponential progression on a linear chart, then you'll get that 
infinite slope at any arbitrary end point along the exponential progression. 
That means that the singularity is "near" at any end point along the time line 
– as long as you are in exponential growth. 
Thus, if one plotted Kurzweil’s graphs only up to 1800, one would predict, following 
his logic, that the ‘singularity’ would be reached around 1830.  (See Kelly (2006) for 
further critiques of Kurzweil’s thesis).   
The argument that this generation is not seeing or producing radical change 
(radical difference) is not often articulated, partly because we seem to be 
overwhelmed by contrary claims of endless alteration which renders such an 
argument untenable, and partly because all generations like to believe that they live in 
the most interesting of times.5 As we have already made clear, this superficial 
impression of endless alteration is seemingly signaled and immediately confirmed by 
all too obvious manifestations of hyperbolized speed and acceleration. And the 
seemingly is important. For, as should be abundantly apparent from our argument 
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even thus far, there is no necessary connection between speed and acceleration and 
any substantive movement or fundamental change. Increasingly rapid representation 
of a range of possibilities, extrapolated from a prior ordering concept or identity, does 
not result in one iota of real difference from, or in, that concept or identity. Rather, 
such playing out simply exemplifies perpetuation of a root of the same. Any actual 
evidence of change (or of the lack thereof) that exists beneath this froth, therefore, is 
worth presenting. But we must be careful here. We are in no sense suggesting that the 
evidence we present below is in itself utterly compelling, that it establishes once and 
for all the case that real movement is in abeyance. Rather what we seek to do is show 
that by looking at evidence that is available, we can muster an at least plausible case 
for such a view. For it seems to us that one of the most noteworthy characteristics of 
the breathless, hyperbolic talk of speed and acceleration is the way in which evidence 
supporting its narrative is either simply assumed and thus notable solely by its 
absence or, on the rare occasion when it is presented, simply flashes by too quickly to 
discern. The method we thus adopt is to compare and contrast the major changes that 
have occurred in this generation with those of previous generations. In particular, our 
assertion is that it is relatively easy to marshal evidence that suggests that the change 
that ‘we’ are experiencing is, relatively speaking, no more – and on balance less – 
than that experienced by those who lived during the mid 19th to mid 20th century.  
Now, decency demands that we hold up our hands to the accusation of cutting our 
historical cloth to suit our argument. Throughout the paper we compare change from 
both sub-periods and the totality of the years 1850 – 1950 with the present, often 
loosely rendered as the post 1950 period. When, on occasions, we take our most 
extreme liberties we are then, grossly unfairly, comparing a period of 100 years with 
that of merely 50. But at least we present some evidence to buttress the position we 
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argue. And if we are to believe the evangelists of the future, the heralds of ever 
increasing change, within and engendering ever increasing time space compression 
(see, particularly, Harvey 1989), then surely we should expect to witness at least as 
much change in a more contemporary 50 year chunk of history as we would in a 
slightly less contemporary hundred year chunk? 
Apperception and valorization of change, indeed its very identification, is of 
course, extremely subjective – radical change for one person may be insignificant to 
someone else – which makes it difficult to ‘objectively’ measure change. Another 
difficulty is that the multi-dimensional and complex nature of change means that any 
measurement of change will always be partial; talk of ‘social’ ‘world’ or 
‘environmental’ change (and indeed stasis) can only be, in the final analysis, 
metaphorical. In such circumstances there can be no meaningful basis for causal 
assertions about, for instance, the link between technological developments and wider 
change. Nobody could prove that technology A has caused more change for 
generation X than technology B did for generation Y. Yet since such assertions are 
nevertheless commonplace and influential, it is worth making some attempt, however 
partial, to assess them empirically.  This immediately raises the issue of what data one 
might collect if one is to honestly inquiry into the question. We have sought to be 
honest in our work, but you might, at this point, consider what data you might collect 
in such an exercise. We well recognize that no matter what data we present, we are 
open to the charge of cutting our cloth to suit our argument. We are, at least, 
bothering to cut some cloth, in clear contradistinction to the breathless prophets of our 
accelerated age whose scissors remain unblunted by use. 
We do not present data assessing the changing rate of change or, in other 
words, its acceleration. Rather we seek to puncture the largely unevidenced platitudes 
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of ever accelerating change with data that suggests that regardless of any change in 
rate of change, there is little change at all to get excited about. Keeping with 
convention, both in relation to the interminable arguments in the social sciences 
between versions of technological and social determinism (and indeed their mimesis 
in similar silliness in more popular press), our focus as the paper proceeds oscillates 
between what might commonly be called ‘social’ change and its evil ‘technological’ 
twin. For our claim is that the endless invocation of acceleration and the 
hyperbolization of speed in these domains, as index of change, is precisely what 
increasingly precludes the cultural political considerations and actions that the making 
(Arendt 1958; Scarry 1985) of radical movement requires.  
Let’s be social to begin with. Figure 1 shows that the annual rate of change in 
the US population over the last century has been comparatively stable for many 
decades now, in contrast to the first half of the twentieth century, which witnessed 
quite dramatic movements in the rate of population change. 
Figure 1: Annual change in population of US (Source: US Census Bureau 
http://www2.census.gov/) 
Fig. 1 Size and % annual change of US 
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Death and major illness, either of oneself or one’s loved ones, are probably the most 
fundamental comparative indicator that we can rely on, since these have a profound 
individual and social effect. Figure 2, which plots the rate of notifiable diseases in the 
US over the last century, shows that a wide range of deadly diseases was rampant in 
the first half of the twentieth century. In contrast, the present generation has enjoyed 
an extended period of calm, with no comparable major disease threat (recognizing that 
we are focused on the US and the Western world).   
Figure 2: Prevalence of notifiable diseases in the US. 
Longevity and death rate data provides another perspective on the issue. Figure 3 
shows that the death rate in the US has been only marginally decreasing since 1950, 
after a period of significant decline in the first half of the twentieth century (there was 
a 38% drop in the death rate in the first half of the century compared to only a 10% 
drop in the second half).  How, then, might we interpret this data?  First, much of the 
increase in longevity is attributable to the improved longevity of the very young and 
there is now little scope for significant advances here. Second, advances in medicine –  
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Figure 3. Death rate and Life Expectancy in the US. Source: CDC/NCHS, National Vital 
Statistics System, US Census Bureau http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/dvs/desc.htm 
 
in which so much hope and money is currently invested – do not explain the data. For 
instance vaccination, while first used in the 18th century, cannot account for the 
massive decline in mortality in the first half of the twentieth century since vaccines 
only became routinely used in pediatric practice after World War II (Guyer et al. 
2000).  Rather, the spectacular improvement in health during the period 1900 to 1950 
can be primarily attributed to State and local health departments who implemented a 
range of public health measures including water treatment, food safety, organized 
waste disposal, and public education (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
1999). Improvements in housing and decreased crowding in cities also reduced 
mortality from diseases caused by person-to-person airborne transmission. Again, 
these are once-off changes. Overall, our essential point is that longevity and death 
rate, which are meaningful in terms of what is happening in society at any point in 
Fig. 3  US Health Statistics 
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time, have been relatively stable for many decades now after the quite radical shifts 
that were witnessed in the century prior to 1950. 
Another surrogate measure of societal change is the rate of suicide if we accept 
Durkheim’s (1897) assertion that ‘anomic’ suicide is caused by sudden changes in the 
social position of an individual mainly due to economic upheavals. There are, of 
course, multiple reasons why people commit suicide but high suicide rates and high 
changes in the suicide rate from year to year do provide prima facie evidence of 
significant social change.  Again, what we mean by significant can be understood 
only comparatively.  
Figure 4: Suicide rate in the US (1900-2000). Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics System. 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/dvs/desc.htm 
Figure 4 presents the annual suicide rate in the US during the last century. This shows 
that the suicide rate in the US has been relatively stable since 1950 in contrast to the 
first half of the century.6 Moreover, not only was the average rate higher, but the 
annual rate of change in the incidence of suicide from year to year was significantly 
Fig. 4  Annual Suicide Rate in US
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higher (see figure 5). Again, this evidence indicates that the period 1900-1950 
witnessed considerably more social upheaval than the period 1950-2000.   
Figure 5: Annual rate of change in suicide rate (1900-2000) 
Turning to things technological, the period 1850-1950 saw a veritable flood of 
discoveries, inventions, and new technologies that brought awesome and 
unprecedented changes to US society and beyond (Table 1). Gordon (2000) has 
usefully grouped this catalogue of innovations into 5 major clusters, each of which is 
centered on a primary breakthrough invention that occurred during the period 1860-
1900.7 The five clusters are: (i) electricity, including the electric light and electric 
motors and derivate technologies such as refrigeration, air conditioning, and mobile 
power machines; (ii) the internal combustion engine and its derivates such as personal 
autos, air transport, the suburb, highway and supermarket; (iii) materials technologies, 
including chemical, plastics and pharmaceuticals; (iv) entertainment, communication 
and information innovations including the telegraph, telephone, phonograph, popular 
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photography, radio, motion pictures and television; (v) urban sanitation, including 
running water and indoor plumbing.    
refrigerator (1850) 
mild steel (1853) 
boolean algebra (1854) 
bicycle (with crank) (1861) 
pasteurisation (1862) 
reinforced concrete (1867) 
medical thermometer (1867) 
the first transcontinental railroad 
(1869) 
polyvinylchloride (PVC) (1872) 
the telephone (1876) 
the phonograph (1877) 
the light bulb (1879) 
cholera vaccine (1880) 
the first electric power station 
(1882) 
motorcycle (1885) 
 
the gasoline-powered automobile 
(1885) 
radio waves (1888) 
pneumatic tyre (1888) 
the punch-card computer (1889) 
photographic film (1889) 
x-rays (1895) 
wireless telegraphy (1895) 
A/C current (1895) 
radioactivity (1896) 
air conditioning (1902) 
the airplane (1903) 
the vacuum tube diode (1904) 
the electron (1904) 
helicopter (1907) 
the Model T automobile (1908) 
motion pictures with sound 
(1913) 
the automobile assembly line 
(1913) 
commercial radio (1920) 
the diptheria vaccine (1923) 
insulin (1923) 
television (1923) 
the liquid fuel rocket (1926) 
aerosols (1927) 
penicillin (1928) 
nuclear fission (1938) 
the electron microscope (1938) 
ball-point pen (1938) 
the electronic calculator (1944) 
the atomic bomb (1945) 
the digital electronic computer 
(1946) 
radiocarbon dating (1947) 
the transistor (1948) 
Table 1: Discoveries and inventions in the period 1850-1950. 
The dates shown in Table 1 are obtained from encyclopedias and other sources and 
are obviously contestable since technologies and inventions evolve over a protracted 
period of time. Temporality is important, because if the period 1850-1950 was the 
period of great technological invention, the period 1950-2000 has essentially been a 
period of technological diffusion (Rogers 1995), as the various technologies moved 
from inventors’ laboratories, to commercial prototypes, to mass utilization. The 
timeline from invention through diffusion to saturation – when knowledge and use of 
a technology is endemic – varies from technology to technology. For instance, the 
percentage of households owning a television (invented in 1923) increased from 9% 
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in 1950 to 87% in 1960 to 95% in 1970, at which point the US Census Bureau ceased 
recording television ownership data.  In this case we can say that the saturation point 
was probably reached sometime in the mid-1960s (about 40 years after invention). 
The gasoline-powered automobile, which was invented in 1885, reached saturation 
point sometime in the mid-1960s as can be seen when we plot the number of 
automobile registrations (figure 6). Ownership peaked around 1980 and ownership in 
the year 2000 is comparable with that in the mid 1960s.   
Figure 6.  Historical trend in car registrations in US (source US Census Data 
http://www2.census.gov/ and Federal Highway Administration Statistics: 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohpi/hss/index.htm) 
Air traffic follows a similar path.  Figure 7 plots the growth in the number of enplaned 
revenue passengers per thousand persons in the US since the 1920s (the birth of the 
technology is set at 1903). The data shows a continual, more or less linear increase in 
growth since 1940. In other words, the rate of change in recent years is not materially 
different from the rate of change experienced in any of the last 6 decades. Indeed, 
when one plots the annual incremental change in enplaned passengers, the resulting 
Fig. 6  Car Registrations in US
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graph (figure 8) indicates that the growth rate has peaked in the 1980s and that we are 
now well into the leveling-off period.  
Figure 7: Annual number of enplaned revenue passengers per ‘000 population. 
Figure 8:  Annual change in number of enplaned revenue passengers per ‘000 population. 
Space constraints mean that we will not present similar curves for other technologies 
listed in Table 1, but cursory knowledge of the empirical world is enough to recognize 
that most of the technologies have long completed their diffusion phase in the US and 
Fig. 8  Annual change in 
enplaned passengers/'000 pop.
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Western economies. If the experience of social, economic and political change is felt 
during diffusion (accepting a soft or dialectical version of technologically determined 
social change) then the changes associated with a wide range of technologies has now 
ended. At the very least, we should be skeptical of claims that we are living in a 
period of unprecedented change. In particular, we should recognize that many of the 
present-day innovations are best understood as enhancements to original technologies 
developed in late 19th and early 20th centuries rather than fundamentally new 
innovations. For instance, the arrival of the mobile (cell) telephone and color 
television are in no way as profound as the arrival of the original telephone or original 
black-and-white television. Using our vocabulary, the phenomenon we are witnessing 
is the consumption of movement by hyperbolized speed and acceleration.   
Now let us briefly look at technological innovations since 1950 (see Table 2).   
videotape recorder (1951) 
barcode (1952) 
oral contraceptives (1954) 
fibre optic (1955) 
first artificial satellite (1957) 
laser (1958) 
integrated circuit (1958) 
audio cassette (1962) 
fibre-tipped pen (1962) 
quasar (1964) 
handheld calculator (1967) 
artificial heart (1969) 
moon landing (1969) 
microprocessor (1971) 
VCR (1971) 
word processor (1972) 
e-mail (1972) 
Skylab launched (1973) 
Apple computer (1976) 
spreadsheet software (1979) 
cellular phones (1979) 
first ‘test tube’ baby (1979) 
‘hard-disk’ drive (1980) 
first genetically modified mouse 
(1980) 
MS-DOS (1981) 
IBM-PC (1981) 
space shuttle (1981) 
genetic fingerprinting (1984) 
first sheep-goat chimaera 
created (1984) 
first genetically-engineered 
animal patented (1988) 
Hubble space telescope (1990) 
Genome project launched (1990) 
world-wide-web (1990) 
first genetically-engineered 
tomatoes sold (1994) 
DVD (1995) 
first animal cloning (1997) 
artificial liver (2001) 
first genetically modified 
humans?  (2001) 
Table 2: Discoveries and inventions since 1950. 
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The first point to make is that many of the technologies are best understood as 
enhancements or derivatives, re-presentations, of original breakthrough inventions 
that occurred in the period 1850-1950.  One measure of this is the small number of 
scientists and inventors that have gained iconic status since 1950 through being 
associated with breakthrough inventions. Who from the last 50 years can be placed 
shoulder-to-shoulder with Edison, Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, Poincare, Darwin, 
Pasteur, Waddington, and so on?   
We can group most of the innovations listed in Table 2 into three main 
clusters: aerospace, information and communication technologies, and genetic 
engineering and we will comment on each of these briefly. Probably the most 
appropriate adjective that we might use to describe the aerospace industry is stagnant, 
if we think back to the excitement, anticipation and change that surrounded the 
industry during the 1950s and 1960s. When Armstrong spoke of a ‘giant leap for 
mankind’ the whole globe watched, listened and gasped in anticipation. Today, the 
workaday world of the aerospace industry is only marginally more stirring than a milk 
round, as the unfortunate space shuttle plonks yet another satellite in the darkness of 
space. The retirement of the Concorde fleet in 2003 marked a literal and symbolic 
return to earth for an industry that once promised wonders and advances that we 
daren’t even imagine. In truth, there have been few radical developments in aerospace 
technology in recent decades, and the stark reality is that commercial aircraft flying 
today are little more than updated versions of aircraft originally developed in the 
1950s and 1960s.   
There have however, apparently been significant, recent technological 
developments in information and communication technologies (ICT). But taken in 
historical perspective, it is certainly possible to argue that the impact of technologies 
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like the world-wide-web is much less than the profound effect that radio achieved in 
the 1920s and television in the 1950s. ICT has undoubtedly experienced rapid growth 
in recent decades and it is this growth that has led many to speak in terms of a ‘new’ 
economy, a ‘third’ industrial revolution or a ‘fifth’ wave, terms that mark our age as 
experiencing a unique, historically significant, and qualitative change. However, 
when one considers the evidence, such assertions are hyperbolic at best and fanciful at 
worst. For instance, if we consider changes in multifactor productivity as one useful 
indicator, we see that while there was significant increase from 1995 to 1999, a major 
fraction of this occurred in the computer and durable manufacturing sectors which 
together comprise only about 12 percent of the private business economy (Gordon 
2000). Moreover, even though US productivity grew at a continuously compounded 
rate of 1.14 between 1995 and 2000, this is less than half the rate of 2.31 percent per 
year achieved between 1929 and 1941, which Field (2003) identifies as the most  
technologically progressive decade of the twentieth century. Figure 9 plots the annual 
percentage change in multifactor productivity for the manufacturing and non-farm 
business sectors and again the data shows that recent decades have been relatively 
stable in terms of productivity changes.   
More fundamentally, we might suggest that technological improvements in 
computing power quickly reach a point of diminishing returns for the simple reason 
that individuals have a limited ability to turn such improvements into productivity 
gains (since productivity, whilst humans are still involved, however peripherally, 
ultimately depends as much on invariant factors like thinking or typing speed as on 
computing power). 
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Fig. 9   12 month Percent Change in 
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Figure 9.  Annual percentage change in multifactor productivity 
(manufacturing and non-farm business) 1950-2001.  Source: US Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/) 
Indeed, if one wanted to push the argument hard, one could date the end of 
truly radical innovation in the ICT field and the reduction of the fundamental activity 
in that field to considerably earlier: to the end of the 100-year period from 1850 to 
1950. ICTs are above all technologies of administration and organization and it is no 
coincidence that talk of information and its revolution first rises into a deafening 
cacophony at just the same time that the cult of the manager begins to take hold. 
Consider the near simultaneity of the appearance of Burnham’s (1941) Managerial 
Revolution, Drucker’s (1947) Big Business, Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) 
Mathematical Theory of Communication, Wiener’s (1948) Cybernetics, Simon’s 
(1947) Administrative Behavior as the bridge between the informational and the 
managerial, and the announcements of the invention of the thinking machine in 
Manchester and Pennsylvania (Large 1984: 36 –7), events that all occurred in the 
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momentous era of the 1940s. The 1940s, viewed thus, become the key period in the 
emergence of the set up, in the Heideggerian sense, of the so-called information 
revolution.8 All that has happened since being regarded, contentiously no doubt, as 
the playing out of already present potential locked into, and unfolding out of, that set 
up. Accelerated re-presentation of the same, rather than real movement or repetition 
of difference. 
Innovations in genetic engineering comprise the third major technological 
cluster. While Gregor Mendel’s discoveries in the 1860s on the breeding of peas are 
normally identified as the foundation of modern genetics, this technological cluster 
has thus far remained largely in the laboratories and has only recently shown signs of 
diffusing into the mass market. Genetic engineering technology is extremely 
controversial and certainly shows no sign of being embraced with the enthusiasm that 
characterized earlier technological clusters.  
Shifting our gaze to the world of politics and economics we recognize the 
same trends. The period 1850-1950 saw two world wars, mass production and 
consumption, the development and crash of the stock market, the Great Depression, 
massive industrial change and restructuring, the communist experiment, the 
Holocaust, and more ‘isms’ than you could shake a cat at. Even the apparently 
relatively stable period of 1950-75, from the perspective of our current presumption, 
witnessed, among other things, the space race, the arms race, the Cold War, the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the feminist and civil rights movements. While there 
has certainly been important economic and political change in recent decades, it is 
implausible to suggest that these changes are either more rapid or more profound than 
those experienced in other periods.  
 24 
For example, although there is much talk about ‘globalization’ as a 
contemporary phenomenon of late modernity, this is more a ‘necessary myth’ than a 
reality as Hirst and Thompson (1996) have compellingly argued. Their position can 
be summarized into a few important points. First, the present highly internationalized 
economy is not unprecedented and in some respects ‘the current international 
economy is less open and integrated than the regime that prevailed from 1870 to 
1914’ (1996: 2, original emphasis).  The evidence they draw on to support this point 
is (a) the ratio of merchandise trade to GDP and (b) capital flows relative to output.  
Their data ‘confirms unequivocally that “openness” was greater during the Gold 
Standard period [1880-1914] than even in the 1980s’ (1996: 28).  Second, contrary to 
the received wisdom, both primary and secondary data on where multinational 
corporations conduct their business indicates that genuinely transnational companies 
are relatively rare. Instead, ‘international businesses are still largely confined to their 
home territory in terms of their overall business activity’ (1996: 98). Third, capital 
mobility is not producing a major shift of investment and employment from the 
advanced to the developing countries, and the Third World continues to remain 
marginal in terms of both investment and trade. Thus, the world economy is far from 
‘global’ and instead ‘trade, investment and financial flows are concentrated in the 
Triad of Europe, Japan and North America’ (1996: 2). 
Returning to the domain from which we began our account, Roy Jacques 
(1995), in a compelling historical study of management discourse, has identified 
much the same phenomenon in management thought. According to Jacques, the only 
‘revolution’ here is the recycling of old ideas: management theory ‘continues to 
revolve around the same issues and continues to present the same limited range of 
potential solutions’ (1995: 155).  The result: ‘we are living through a curious moment 
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when a “revolution” is being announced whose avant garde sit at the heart of the 
current power elite and whose internationale is composed from minor variations on a 
nineteenth-century theme’. Likewise, René ten Bos (2000) sees management theory 
and practice as manifestations of cyclical fashions, while Michael Kennedy (1999) 
presents much the same idea, albeit applied more narrowly. 
Accounting for Acceleration Parading as Movement 
The empirical data, at least that which we have chosen to present, indicates that the 
extent of change that we are experiencing today, let alone its rate, is certainly not 
unprecedented. Our data has focused on the period since 1850, but rapid and profound 
change has been a recurring feature of American and world history. We need only 
think for a while about what life was like for those people who lived during the 
colonization of the Americas, the Reformation, the Renaissance, or the (extended) fall 
of the Roman Empire. It is this historical context that compels us to at least venture to 
take the contrarian position that we live in a period of relative inertia. Our argument 
is that the great changes we seem to be witnessing in the present are not in themselves 
particularly novel and indeed were actually seeded by the Second Industrial 
Revolution, which is still playing itself out. The products of these changes have now 
virtually saturated the market but there is little substantive innovation within this and 
on the horizon. Talk of a Third Industrial Revolution is simply both premature and 
hyperbolic. It is acceleration, not movement. 
But why then does our culture feel such a need to see ours as the time of 
radical change? What politics are served by such obfuscation? In part, it is obvious 
when we consider the consequences of the contrary position: if all other periods of 
recent history can be see as times of radical change, then the contemporary appears as 
slow. And slowness, when viewed through any of our seemingly progressive, 
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contemporary managerial models, would suggest that we are approaching the plateau 
and inevitable decline. So we worship at the Cult of the New, trapped within a 
complex made of Kant’s moral character of radical, autonomous self-making and 
Hegel’s teleology. 
So clearly then this cult itself is not new.  We can probably trace its origins at 
least as far back as Michelangelo (Berman 1982, Foucault 1984, Szakolczai 2007), 
but we will confine ourselves to examining the cult within the discourse of 
management, which is so endemic and influential in contemporary western society, 
and which, both as a discourse and as a powerful elite, lives on and thrives on this 
Cult of the New.  To better understand the phenomenon, it helps to look back at the 
emergence of management during the second half of the nineteenth century (hot on 
the heels of the emergence of the idea of the avant garde in art). As Shenhav and 
Weitz (2000) have documented, ‘management’ was invented in large part by 
engineers in a quasi-political process within which the idea of uncertainty was 
accorded a pivotal role.  We say quasi-political because the engineers saw and 
depicted themselves as outside of politics, at a time when organizations and societies 
were engulfed in ideological conflict between labor and capital. The risks of 
uncertainty were propagated by (and for) engineers for (only) they would be able to 
provide pragmatic, ‘rational’ solutions, free from ideology. In this way, ‘the concept 
of uncertainty may be regarded as socially constructed knowledge that was created in 
a unique historical context and enacted by organizational actors and management 
theorists’ (Shenhav and Weitz 2000: 373). And ever-greater uncertainty requires ever-
greater imposition of rational solutions and the ever more appearance of de-
politicization. Thus, one way of looking at the history of management is as an 
ongoing game where different groups have wrestled power from the previous power 
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elite in organizations using essentially the same argument about uncertainty and 
change that the engineers first employed over a hundred years ago:  ‘The world is 
rapidly changing and unless you invest in ‘X’ (inserting one of following for ‘X’: 
marketing, quality, HR, project management, IT, cultural change, knowledge 
management, strategy, etc.) your organization will DIE’.   The high point in this 
extended narrative probably occurred in the 1960s when ‘strategic management’ took 
center stage within management discourse.  We will briefly say two things about 
strategy.9 First, more than the more functional realms of administration, strategy is 
centrally about describing and inventing a future, which means it is necessarily 
abstract and ephemeral.  The future is always made up.  And, in line with Thomas’s 
theorem ( ‘situations we define as real become real in their consequences’ (Thomas 
and Morris 1966: 301)),  the ubiquitousness of the strategy discourse both reflects and 
creates an ephemeral reality, feeding off itself in a frenzy of increasing hyperbole.   
Second, an important strategy of economic power elites is to dominate the strategy 
discussion, because this is perhaps their only way of justifying the faith of others in 
their prescience. But critiques of strategic management over the last decade or so, 
such as Mintzberg’s (1994) provocative analysis in The Rise and Fall of Strategic 
Planning, indicate that this faith is now being tested, not least by influential 
commentators on management (see also Ghoshal (2005)). Perhaps this is a sign of 
things to come (or perhaps not, since we frankly do not know).   
Politics, since the emergence of socialist and social-democratic parties, has 
increasingly employed a similar rhetoric of rationality as the weapon of choice in 
engaging with an uncertain and fast-changing world  – with industrial relations, 
economics, crime, etc. depicted as problems to be solved through rational means.  
This rhetoric reaches its apotheosis perhaps in the endlessly declared civilized ‘Wars 
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upon…[add social problem of your choice]’. And, as such, with the ceaseless 
positioning of parties as the best placed to manage in times of such fevered (faux) 
change – (faux) change that has to be continually re-affirmed.  
And re-affirmed is the word. Even the most minimal assay of the evidence of 
this (ever increasing) phenomenon is seemingly no longer required. For our culture 
has transformed change into what Grey (2003) refers to as a ‘fetish’. We have 
institutionalized change to the point where its reality is unquestioned. Whitehead’s 
‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’ (1967: particularly 51 - 52) can usefully be 
applied to the idea that things are rapidly changing. Ironically, our culture has 
institutionalized or ‘concretized’ the belief that nothing is set in concrete, that 
everything is forever changing.  ‘The world is changing at an ever-faster rate and you 
and your organization must change with it’ is the shared, taken-for-granted 
assumption that has elevated the sale of books, seminars and training programs on all 
manner of governance, which consequently appears as management, to an 
unprecedented level. And social theory is far from an innocent bystander in this 
regard. For example, according to Ruane (2003) the emergence of that set of framing 
concepts generally branded as ‘postmodernity’ has had a key role to play. Here, the 
notion of ‘rationality’ again takes center stage. For, as Ruane (2003: 17) puts it, for 
those who wish to see a discontinuity, a ‘transition in epochal terms’… 
…there is a move beyond the centralisation, rationality, homogeneity, universalism 
and ‘traditionalism’ of modernity to a more radically differentiated, fragmented, 
localised and fluid world, one that is so saturated with hyper-realities that the very 
nature of reality is in question. 
Crucial to the perception of such a transition and also, indeed, to a (mis)recognition of 
ever-increasing change is a process of forgetting, forgetting that the concretized, 
institutionalized entity of such ‘change’ has been socially constructed.  In a seminal 
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study, Latour and Woolgar (1986; Woolgar 1988) observed that once a scientific 
‘fact’ comes to be undisputed, the constructed nature of the ‘fact’ is ‘forgotten’ 
through a process they refer to as ‘blackboxing’. More generally, we also ‘forget’ the 
constructed nature of the technologies, facts and institutions that we have inherited, 
and come to believe that earlier generations were static compared with our own. In 
other words, changes in even relatively recent history are ‘forgotten’ and blended into 
an endless (or rather beginingless) tradition wherein nothing changes. And in this way 
contemporary changes appear quite radical and rapid since they are set against the 
invented stasis of ‘tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).   
This process is of course not one only perceptible in modernity and its 
apparent successors; there is always a trade between continuity and change, a trade in 
which, depending upon cultural circumstance, one side or other of the binary is 
privileged. For example, as Dodgshon (1998) notes, Sahlins emphasized how the 
South Sea islanders (a supposedly static cultural system) absorbed their initial 
engagement with European adventurers through their existing concepts and 
categories. In so far as he was perceived to be a manifestation of a real Hawaiian 
deity, ‘Captain Cook was a tradition for Hawaiians before he was a fact’ (Sahlins 
1987: 148).  And although the reproduction of culture through praxis invariably 
brings with it the possibility of its transformation, what might, to others from the 
outside, appear to be a major change can nevertheless be absorbed nonchalantly by 
the culture in question and not noticed as significant. Not surprisingly however, the 
inverse can also hold. Levi-Strauss (1966: 234) famously distinguished between ‘hot’ 
societies (those open to change) and ‘cold’ ones (‘primitive’ societies, seemingly 
resistant to change). If we inhabit a ‘hot’ culture, then that which might otherwise 
appear as relative inertia is absorbed into the socio-cultural mindset in a way that’s 
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compatible with its extant speed paradigm.  Following Sahlins then, when cold 
engages with hot it stays cold and merely interprets that hot as part of the cold (for 
example, the islanders interpreting Captain Cook as part of their pantheon), and so the 
cold society stays cold.  And likewise, in our apparently hot contemporary 
circumstance, when we meet cold, relative inertia, we (mis)recognize it, interpret that 
cold as hot, and retain our own self-image as a hot society. 
What is crucial to note here is that there is no Archimedean point from which 
change can objectively be judged. Whilst Levi-Strauss, we guess, sits at the warm 
hearth of intellectual detachment, able to perceive in a seemingly disinterested fashion 
the workings of the hot and the cold upon each other, he is, as much as those he 
comments upon, trapped within webs of meaning that must, in the final analysis, 
remain partially beyond him. Similarly, the proposition of ‘tradition’ as invented, 
whilst undoubtedly useful, must itself be viewed with a similar degree of skepticism 
in any ultimate instance. But if we do choose to run with such a distinction, and 
clearly we do, perhaps we can do so more subtly, with requisite humility, if we see the 
modern and its derivatives as eras and ways of knowing in which social theory itself 
is both part of invented tradition and a key constituent of our ability to assay practices 
and render them as traditional, invented or not. Returning to Ruane (2003: 18): 
The postmodern moment is now (more or less) past, but its impact was considerable 
across all domains of culture. One of its effects on social theory was to reinforce the 
perception of the present as a point of transition to a world where change will be a 
permanent and universal condition.  
 
Finally, perhaps most fundamentally, we may favor acceleration over real movement 
since, following the horrors of the latter half of the period 1850-1950, we have simply 
become too terrified of radical change to actually really want it. This point is akin to 
what Hughes (1981: 298) had to say about the speechlessness of art in the face of the 
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twentieth century’s realities. For despite our continuing longing for progress we are 
often willing to settle for the reactionary, for a romanticized radical (in the most 
pejorative sense of the term), because we recall only too well how the worship of real 
Romantic heroes can allow their unquestioning followers to be led into the abyss 
(Kavanagh and O’Leary 2004). 
However, despite our fears we know that the world is always changing and we 
also know that precluding the possibility of change suggests an equally unacceptable 
utopian, stasis. For the journey to the abyss is also choreographed by the promise of a 
final solution. The twin rhetorics of hyperbolized speed/acceleration and utopia may 
thus be seen as Janus-like faces of late modernity, reflecting the continuing influences 
of the ideals of Romanticism and the Rationalism upon which it was built and against 
which it reacted. On the one hand we read, and in part want to believe, that we have 
reached the end10, that we have reached utopia and that it is impossible to envisage 
any alternative, for this would allow us to sit back and relax in the best of all possible 
worlds. But such a line is unthinkable and contrary to the preceding logic (of the 
radical, innovative, ever-changing market) that apparently got us to this point, that 
delivered to us, and us to, this promised land. And so we find ourselves in the 
contradictory thrall of both rapid change and utopia, which (axiomatically) does not 
change at all. 
Armitage and Roberts (2002) work this line in an intriguing way, through their 
invocation of the work of Virilio. They outline the existence of a form of writing and 
manifesto for being in the world that they characterize as chronotopian, with an 
associated discourse constituted by a curious mélange of bodies including both those 
of the ‘prophet hypsters of the information superhighway’ (Kroker and Weinstein 
1994: 77), such as Bill Gates, and seemingly more disinterested observers, such as 
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Giddens and Castells. For despite their obvious differences, all contributors to 
chronotopia tend to evoke a ‘new social imaginary’ (Armitage and Roberts 2002: 48) 
that promises a better future for us all. But every silver lining has a cloud and for 
Armitage and Roberts, following Bauman and Virilio, this cloud is the other of 
chronotopia, a ‘“hypermodern” or “excessive” individually experienced 
chronodystopia’ (2002: 43). A place (if such a term still bears meaning) in which the 
uncomfortable assumption is… 
…that speed is collapsing and therefore involved with the realm of acceleration and 
reversal, with the idea that, today, speed is a crossroads of simultaneous events … 
Thus the supremacy of short-term thinking over long-term thinking is established 
along with the social imaginary that the imperative of speed-space is an acceptable 
mode of individual experience in hypermodernity (Armitage and Roberts 2002: 50). 
For most of us, most of the time, the paradox of the present – in which we are 
simultaneously deafened by endless talk of speed/acceleration and the fulfilling of the 
promise of utopia – is resolved, albeit chimerically, by the consumption of substantive 
movement by hyperbolized speed and acceleration and the substitution of the latter 
for the former. We inhabit chronodystopia but refuse to recognize our location. We 
feel we are moving and moving faster, evacuating our cultural politics of need, desire 
and instruments for substantive change. We represent the same rather than repeat 
difference. We are running to stand still.  We are accelerating to inertia. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Howard Newby, Chief Executive of the Higher Education Funding Council for England The Times 
Higher Education Supplement, August 6th, 2004: 12. 
2 See http://www.microsoft.com/billgates/speeches/03-25georgetown.asp (accessed July 7th, 2006). 
3 See http://www.microsoft.com/billgates/speeches/2006/05-17CEOSummit.asp (accessed July 7th, 
2006). 
4 
http://www.labour.org.uk/index.php?id=news2005&ux_news%5Bid%5D=ac05tb&cHash=d8353c3d74 
(accessed July 7th, 2006). The same type of rhetoric is promulgated by organizations such as the 
Acceleration Studies Foundation (http://www.accelerating.org/) which, according to its website, is “a 
growing community of 3,100 future-oriented technologists, entrepreneurs, industry, institutional and 
government leaders, academics, scientists, strategists, humanists, and others interested in better 
understanding and guidance of accelerating planetary change.” 
5 Something of a simplification perhaps, but the price of polemic! It might perhaps be better to suggest 
that the past is always selectively re-presented and appropriated by the present. Portions of it are no 
doubt simply rendered as dull, tardy, or out of date, while other images of heritage are valorized, 
treated as contemporarily relevant, privileged over a present which is itself thus seen as regressive in 
regard to them (we are grateful to the editorial review for this necessary complexification). 
6 The age adjusted suicide rate (year 2000 standard population) is only available for the years 1950, 
1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, and 2000.  Since the demographic distribution in the first half of the 
twentieth century is more akin to the year 1950 than 2000, the age adjusted suicide rate for the period 
1900-1950 would be even higher than the crude rate plotted.  
7  See http://www.greatachievements.org for a chronology of these technologies.   
8 See Weber (1996, particularly chapter 3) for an enlightening discussion of the Heideggerian notion of 
the ‘setup’.  
9 We thank a reviewer for these insights. 
10 Fukuyama’s (1989) ‘end of history’ thesis is typical of this genre, but it is also reflected in other 
announcements of the end: of industrial society (Touraine 1971), of organized capitalism (Lash and 
Urry 1987), of the social (Baudrillard 1988), of work (Rifkin 1995), of marketing (Brown 1993) and of 
evolution (Jones 1997).   
